Public choice

Public choice, or public choice theory, is "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science."^[1] It includes the study of political behavior. In political science, it is the subset of positive political theory that studies self-interested agents (voters, politicians, bureaucrats) and their interactions, which can be represented in a number of ways—using (for example) standard constrained utility maximization, game theory, or decision theory.^[1] It is the origin and intellectual foundation of contemporary work in political economy.^[2]

In popular use, "public choice" is often used as a shorthand for components of modern public choice theory that focus on how elected officials, bureaucrats, and other government agents' perceived self-interest can influence their decisions. Economist James M. Buchanan received the 1986 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences "for his development of the contractual and constitutional bases for the theory of economic and political decision-making".^[3]

Public choice analysis has roots in positive analysis ("what is") but is sometimes used for normative purposes ("what ought to be") to identify a problem or suggest improvements to constitutional rules (as in constitutional economics).^[1]^[4]^[5] But the normative economics of social decision-making is typically placed under the closely related field of social choice theory, which takes a mathematical approach to the aggregation of individual interests, welfare, or votes.^[6] Much early work had aspects of both, and both fields use the tools of economics and game theory. Since voter behavior influences public officials' behavior, public-choice theory often uses results from social-choice theory. General treatments of public choice may also be classified under public economics.^[7]

Building upon economic theory, public choice has a few core tenets. One is that no decision is made by an aggregate whole. Rather, decisions are made by combined individual choices. A second is the use of markets in the political system.^[8] A third is the self-interested nature of everyone in a political system. But as Buchanan and Gordon Tullock argue, "the ultimate defense of the economic-individualist behavioral assumption must be empirical [...] The only final test of a model lies in its ability to assist in understanding real phenomena."^[9]

^ ^a ^b ^c Gordon Tullock, [1987] 2008, "public choice," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. .
^ Alberto Alesina, Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, 2006. “Reply to Blankart and Koester's Political Economics versus Public Choice Two Views of Political Economy in Competition,” Kyklos, 59(2), pp. 201–208
^ "The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1986". Nobel Foundation. Archived from the original on 2008-10-12. Retrieved 2008-10-14.
^ James M. Buchanan, 1990. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics," Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), pp. 1–18.
^ Compare: Dennis C. Mueller, 2008. "constitutions, economic approach to," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract: "The economic approach to constitutions applies the methodology of economics to the study of constitutions. This entry reviews the normative literature on constitutions, which assumes a two-stage collective decision process, and the positive literature that examines the decisions made by constitutional conventions and their economic consequences."
^ Found in the JEL classification codes at JEL: D71.
^ At JEL: HO – General of the JEL classification codes and as in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, v. 8, p. 864 and Online.
^ Buchanan, James M. (1964). "What Should Economists Do?". Southern Economic Journal. 30 (3): 213–222. doi:10.2307/1055931. ISSN 0038-4038. JSTOR 1055931.
^ James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 28; cf. ibid., 21

[Tullock2008-1] Gordon Tullock, [1987] 2008, "public choice," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. .

[Alesina2006-2] Alberto Alesina, Torsten Persson, Guido Tabellini, 2006. “Reply to Blankart and Koester's Political Economics versus Public Choice Two Views of Political Economy in Competition,” Kyklos, 59(2), pp. 201–208

[3] "The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1986". Nobel Foundation. Archived from the original on 2008-10-12. Retrieved 2008-10-14.

[4] James M. Buchanan, 1990. "The Domain of Constitutional Economics," Constitutional Political Economy, 1(1), pp. 1–18.

[5] Compare: Dennis C. Mueller, 2008. "constitutions, economic approach to," The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2nd Edition. Abstract: "The economic approach to constitutions applies the methodology of economics to the study of constitutions. This entry reviews the normative literature on constitutions, which assumes a two-stage collective decision process, and the positive literature that examines the decisions made by constitutional conventions and their economic consequences."

[6] Found in the JEL classification codes at JEL: D71.

[7] At JEL: HO – General of the JEL classification codes and as in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, v. 8, p. 864 and Online.

[8] Buchanan, James M. (1964). "What Should Economists Do?". Southern Economic Journal. 30 (3): 213–222. doi:10.2307/1055931. ISSN 0038-4038. JSTOR 1055931.

[Buchanan1962-9] James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, 1962. The Calculus of Consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 28; cf. ibid., 21

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

[8]

[9]